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Who are our ‘best of the best’?
Frega Ferdinand 
Wenas Inkiriwang
is a lecturer at the 
Indonesian Defense 
University.
I
n the 21st century everything is interconnected. Through 
interconnectivity, most anyone can access information faster and 
with greater ease, in particular with technological advancements. 
Many developing nations have grown more rapidly than they otherwise 
would have because of globalization. Some are approaching par with 
developed nations, both economically and militarily. With their growing 
economies, these countries have been able to allocate more funding 
for military development – both hardware, which touches on weapons 
systems and platforms, and software, which focuses on human capital.
Indonesia is one of the countries that has enjoyed the benefits of 
globalization. As one of the world’s 10 largest economies, according 
to the World Bank, Indonesia has shown impressive economic growth, 
allowing it to quadruple its defense budget within the last decade. With 
its Minimum Essential Forces (MEF) expansion project, Indonesia 
is projected to modernize its military platforms by 2024. Jakarta has 
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purchased modern armaments and weapons 
systems, and has signed agreements on jointly 
developing additional weapons systems with 
a number of countries. Similarly, Indonesia 
is revamping its own national defense 
industry. Combined with an offset strategy 
that facilitates transfers of technology from 
partnering countries, Indonesia has started a 
new chapter in its military transformation.
Nevertheless, limitations remain in 
developing human capital within the Armed 
Forces. Although Indonesia established its 
own defense university in March 2009, the 
military continues to follow a conventional 
model in managing its human resources. This is 
a concern. Having to deal with a very dynamic 
environment in the 21st century, a military 
officer should be adaptive and versatile. Of 
course, this would complement the basic 
requirements of having a solid intellectual 
capability and consistent performance. 
However, if we compare the Armed 
Forces with Indonesia’s National Police, the 
promotion of police officers occurs about 18 
months earlier than their military peers who 
graduate in the same year. This is particularly 
the case with middle-ranking personnel. In 
fact, the police also grant special promotions 
for officers who earn special achievements. 
Within the military, meanwhile, that same 
policy is rarely applied. This is due to 
the different parameters used by the two 
institutions. It is easier for police personnel 
because the institution can measure officer 
achievements by solved cases. One current 
Indonesian police general received a special 
rank promotion three times; for the military, 
that would be harder because there is no 
quantitative measurement. 
Yet, this should not stop the military trying 
to find an alternative parameter that could 
help identify exceptional achievements by its 
personnel, in particular officers, and expedite 
their rise up the ranks.
The militaries of developed countries have “fast-track” promotion systems. 
Singapore, for instance, identifies competent 
future military leaders from the very early 
stages of their careers. Starting from Officer 
Cadet School, prospective candidates are 
eligible for two prestigious scholarships: the 
Presidential Scholarship and the Singapore 
Armed Forces Overseas Scholarship. But only a 
handful of cadets are selected. 
A good example of a scholarship recipient 
is Chan Chun Sing, a retired Singaporean 
If we compare the Armed Forces 
with Indonesia’s National Police, 
the promotion of police officers 
occurs about 18 months earlier 
than their military peers who 
graduate in the same year.
Army general who received the Presidential 
Scholarship in 1988. This allowed him to study 
at the University of Cambridge in England 
and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
in the United States. He was later promoted 
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to chief of Singapore’s Army when he was still 
in his early 40s. Chan, who is now a minister 
in the office of Singapore’s prime minister, 
was one of many officers identified and “fast-
tracked” through the ranks of the country’s 
military.
The United States is another notable 
country that has implemented a fast-track 
2004. Yudhoyono was the top graduate of the 
Indonesian Armed Forces Academy in 1973 
and was personally awarded the prestigious 
Adhi Makayasa medal by Soeharto himself. 
Yudhoyono joined the Army Strategic Reserve 
and became an Airborne Battalion platoon 
commander. He did the US Army Ranger 
Course in Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1975 and 
later attended the US Army Command and 
General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas. He earned a degree from Webster 
University, in the US state of Missouri, and 
later a doctorate from the Bogor Agricultural 
Institute. He was always promoted earlier than 
his peers due to his performance, and he went 
on to be a cabinet minister, politician and 
Indonesia’s sixth president.
More recently, however, the Indonesian Armed Forces has halted its accelerated 
promotion program, due to certain “internal 
considerations.” This is a mistake, and the 
military should revise its fast-track program. 
Facing global competition, in particular in the 
military sector, requires more competent and 
productive human resources. Officers who 
demonstrate exceptional and extraordinary 
performance, both operationally and 
academically, must have the opportunity for 
accelerated promotion. 
In addition, it would be fair to give 
these selected officers a chance to study at 
prestigious universities around the world that 
can prepare them as future military – and 
civilian – leaders, such as Harvard, Oxford and 
Stanford.
To appreciate the necessity of a fast-track 
scheme within the realities of Indonesia’s 
In Indonesia, the fast-track system 
was actually implemented during 
the late President Soeharto’s New 
Order regime. Ironically, among 
those who benefitted from it was 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
system. Its own scheme is known as “below 
the zone” or “BZ.” This system identifies a 
group of top-notch officers – at most a mere 
10 percent of the total American military 
officer corps. To gain entry to this elite group, 
an officer must consistently demonstrate 
exceptional performance, not only in his or 
her respective field assignments, but also 
in academics. Standing out as a superior 
performer is mandatory. 
In Indonesia, the fast-track system was 
actually implemented during the late President 
Soeharto’s New Order regime. Ironically, 
among those who benefitted from it was Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono, who went on to become 
the country’s first directly elected president, in 
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present military system, one should compare an 
officer who works nearly 16 hours a day with 
another officer who serves only eight hours a 
day. Most superiors give their most competent 
and exceptional officers, who may be classified 
as potential fast-track material, more of a 
workload than their peers. Yet in the current 
system there is no distinction in measuring 
performance. Both the officer who works 
16 hours a day and the officer who serves 
only eight have the same time frame for their 
promotions. This is unfair to those officers 
who work harder than their colleagues.
Indeed, if the Indonesian Armed Forces 
chooses to implement a fast-track scheme, 
there should be a fair and comprehensive 
mechanism that can measure any exceptional 
and extraordinary achievement, as well as the 
performance of individual officers. Those who 
graduate in the top 10 percent at the military 
academy could have the privilege of moving 
forward on an accelerated track. Nonetheless, 
should there be any indication of poor 
performance or lack of integrity, sanctions and 
punishment must also be applied fairly. This 
means they would go back to the regular track. 
Meanwhile, if there is an officer who did 
not graduate from the academy in the top 10 
percent, but does something extraordinary, 
he or she should be considered for the fast-
track scheme. Of course, once this individual 
is identified, consistent achievement and 
performance must be maintained to remain in 
the top 10 percent, similar to the US military’s 
BZ scheme. Otherwise, the officer will also 
return to the regular scheme.
So, the fast-track system should be dynamic 
and adaptive. Those who consistently perform 
exceptionally will always get the privilege to 
earn more rewards. Domestic or international 
achievement may help officers attain 
accelerated promotion. If regular promotion 
may take three years, the fast-track officers 
could get their rank promotion within two 
or two-and-a-half years. Such incentives 
would stimulate a more constructive and fair 
competition among officers. It would also 
encourage a more productive system in which 
officers actually demonstrate their best. 
This scheme would require the Indonesian 
Armed Forces to formulate policy and set 
criteria for prospective candidates for the fast-
track list. If they perform continuously above 
standards, they may get early rank promotion 
several times before they would be eligible for 
promotion as a flag officer on the regular track. 
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Officers who demonstrate 
exceptional and extraordinary 
performance, both operationally 
and academically, must have 
the opportunity for accelerated 
promotion.
70 I N D O N E S I A  3 6 0 S T R AT E G I C  R EV I EW
This means fast-trackers could become a flag 
officer between three and six years earlier than 
their peers. Having accelerated promotion 
on this schedule would definitely distinguish 
them from their classmates. In fact, they may 
also get a promotion earlier than regular-track 
senior officers.
Should the Indonesian Armed Forces have 
the opportunity to produce such officers 
it may be able to cultivate a pool of young 
future leaders who are more capable, both 
operationally and academically, as well as 
productive and energetic. Furthermore, if 
the officer is competent enough to pursue a 
higher degree such as a doctorate, it would 
benefit the Armed Forces as a whole. Given 
that it has to interact with international 
military counterparts from around the world, 
Indonesia’s military must have credible 
human capital. For example, the United States 
military conducts more training exercises with 
Indonesia than it does with any other country, 
according to Robert O Blake Jr, the US 
ambassador to Indonesia.
Certainly, reintroducing a fast-track scheme within the Indonesian Armed 
Forces would not be easy. There could be 
resistance, especially among those threatened 
by fast-track officers who are much younger 
and better educated. This is natural; there will 
be winners and losers. But fair competition 
will hopefully encourage the Indonesian 
military to continuously assess and put forward 
prospective future leaders.
The military needs advance planning to 
reintroduce a fast-track program. First, it 
should integrate all its database systems to 
help identify potential candidates. Second, it 
should develop a 360-degree assessment that 
involves not only superiors, but also peers and 
subordinates who work in the same branches 
as potential candidates. Third, it must have 
a preparatory English program as well as 
any other required programs so candidates 
are prepared. Fourth, it should publicize the 
fast-track scheme to all Indonesian military 
personnel, in particular officers. Fifth, 
it should continuously reassess potential 
candidates and their accomplishments, both 
operationally and academically. Sixth, it 
should provide a fair chance for those who 
are not listed as fast-track officers. Seventh, 
it should constantly improve the system by 
benchmarking it against other countries.
The Indonesian Armed Forces, clearly, 
needs a fast-track system to transform itself 
into a modern organization. Sophisticated 
weapons systems and platforms are one thing, 
but human capital will determine success as 
the military attempts to reform as part of 
Indonesia’s overall democratic progression. It’s 
time for the military to standardize a fast-
track scheme that will create actual internal 
competition, in order to push forward the best 
officers to one day lead. True leadership within 
the top levels of the military is essential for this 
to have any chance.
The Indonesian Armed Forces, clearly, needs a fast-track system to 
transform itself into a modern organization.
